Many philosophers have thought that human beings do or pursue only what we see as good. These “guise-of-the-good” views face powerful challenges and counterexamples, such as akratic action, in which we do what we ourselves believe we ought not do. I propose a new way for guise-of-the-good views to address this central counterexample by appealing to conflicting beliefs. I then answer concerns that this appeal is insufficiently explanatory, attributes too much conflict, leaves out an essential asymmetry in action against one’s “better” judgment, attributes systematic error about one’s own beliefs, and is too implausible.

中文翻译：

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以善为幌子的不自然行为

许多哲学家认为人类只做或追求我们认为好的东西。这些“善意伪装”的观点面临着强大的挑战和反例，例如我们做我们自己认为不应该做的事情。我提出了一种伪装好观点的新方法，通过诉诸相互冲突的信念来解决这个中心反例。然后，我回答了这样的担忧，即这种呼吁解释性不足，归因于太多冲突，在行动中遗漏了与“更好”判断相悖的基本不对称性，归因于自己信念的系统性错误，并且太不可信。