Recent rival attempts in the philosophy of science to put forward a general theory of the properties that all (and only) natural kinds across the sciences possess may have proven to be futile. Instead, I develop a general methodological framework for how to philosophically study kinds. Any kind has to be investigated and articulated together with the human aims that motivate referring to this kind, where different kinds in the same scientific domain can answer to different concrete aims. My core contention is that nonepistemic aims, including environmental, ethical, and political aims, matter as well. This is defended and illustrated based on several examples of kinds, with particular attention to the role of social-political aims: species, race, gender, as well as personality disorders and oppositional defiant disorder as psychiatric kinds. Such nonepistemic aims and values need not always be those personally favoured by scientists but may have to reflect values that matter to relevant societal stakeholders. Despite the general agenda to study “kinds,” I argue that philosophers should stop using the term “natural kinds,” as this label obscures the relevance of human interests and the way in which many kinds are based on contingent social processes subject to human responsibility.

科学哲学中最近的竞争对手试图提出一个关于所有（并且只有）自然种类在科学中拥有的属性的一般理论可能已被证明是徒劳的。相反，我为如何从哲学上研究种类开发了一个通用的方法论框架。任何种类都必须与激发提及此类的人类目标一起进行调查和阐明，其中同一科学领域中的不同种类可以针对不同的具体目标做出回应。我的核心观点是，非认知目标，包括环境、伦理和政治目标，也很重要。这是基于几种类型的例子进行辩护和说明的，特别注意社会政治目标的作用：物种、种族、性别，以及作为精神病类型的人格障碍和对立违抗障碍。这种非认知的目标和价值观不一定是科学家个人喜欢的目标和价值观，但可能必须反映对相关社会利益相关者很重要的价值观。尽管研究“种类”的总体议程，我认为哲学家应该停止使用“自然种类”一词，因为这个标签掩盖了人类利益的相关性以及许多种类基于受人类责任的偶然社会过程的方式.