It is has been argued that there is a problem with moral testimony: testimony is deferential, and basing judgments and actions on deferentially acquired knowledge prevents them from having moral worth. What morality perhaps requires of us, then, is that we understand why a proposition is true, but this is something that cannot be acquired through testimony. I argue here that testimony can be both deferential as well as cooperative, and that one can acquire moral understanding through cooperative testimony. The problem of moral testimony is thus not a problem with testimony generally, but a problem of deferential testimony specifically.

中文翻译：

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道德理解与合作见证

有人认为，道德证词存在问题：证词是恭敬的，将判断和行动建立在恭敬地获得的知识上会阻止它们具有道德价值。那么，道德可能对我们的要求是，我们理解为什么一个命题是正确的，但这是无法通过证词获得的。我在这里争辩说，证词可以是恭敬的也合作社，并且可以通过合作证词获得道德理解。因此，道德证词的问题不是一般证词的问题，而是具体的恭敬证词问题。