This paper challenges a standard interpretation according to which Frege’s conception of logic (early and late) is at odds with the contemporary one, because on the latter’s view logic is formal, while on Frege’s view it is not, given that logic’s subject matter is reality’s most general features. I argue that Frege – in Begriffsschrift – retained the idea that logic is formal; Frege sees logic as providing the ‘logical cement’ that ties up together the contentful concepts of specific sciences, not the most general truths. Finally, I discuss how Frege conceives of the application of Begriffsschrift, and of its status as a ‘lingua characteristica’.

中文翻译：

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逻辑的形式化与弗雷格的手抄报

本文挑战了一种标准解释，根据该标准解释，弗雷格的逻辑概念（早期和晚期）与当代的观点不一致，因为在后者看来，逻辑是形式的，而在弗雷格看来不是，因为逻辑的主题是现实的。最普遍的特征。我认为弗雷格——在初稿– 保留逻辑是形式的想法；弗雷格将逻辑视为将特定科学的内容概念联系在一起的“逻辑粘合剂”，不是最普遍的真理。最后，我将讨论弗雷格如何构想 Begriffsschrift 的应用，以及它作为“语言特征”的地位。