Most scholars assume that Kantian moral strength is needed only when it comes to following maxims. However, accounts based on this assumption can be challenged by Kant’s claim that virtue, as moral strength of the human will, can never become a habit because its maxims must be freely adopted in new situations. Even some accounts that are not based on this assumption fail to meet this challenge. By drawing on my interpretation of the Kantian capacity for self-control, I propose a twofold account of moral strength that can accommodate Kant’s point that maxims of virtue must always be freely adopted.

中文翻译：

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康德的道德力量观

大多数学者认为康德式的道德力量只有在遵循格言时才需要。然而，康德声称美德作为人类意志的道德力量永远不会成为一种习惯，因为它的格言必须在新情况下自由采用，因此基于这一假设的解释可能会受到挑战。甚至一些不基于此假设的帐户也无法应对这一挑战。通过借鉴我对康德自我控制能力的解释，我提出了一种道德力量的双重解释，可以适应康德的观点，即美德准则必须始终被自由采用。