The Will Theory of Rights says that having control over another’s duties grounds rights. The Will Theory has commonly been objected to on the grounds that it undergenerates right-ascriptions along three fronts. This paper systematically examines a range of positions open to the Will Theory in response to these counterexamples, while being faithful to the Will Theory’s focus on normative control. It argues that of the seemingly plausible ways the defender of the Will Theory can proceed, one cannot both be faithful to the theory’s focus on normative control as the grounds of rights and achieve extensional adequacy.

中文翻译：

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超越规范控制：反对权利的意志理论

权利意志理论说，控制他人的义务是权利的基础。意志理论通常受到反对，理由是它在三个方面削弱了权利归属。本文系统地研究了一系列对意志理论开放的立场，以回应这些反例，同时忠实于意志理论对规范控制的关注。它认为，在意志理论的捍卫者可以采取的看似合理的方式中，一个人不能既忠实于该理论对作为权利基础的规范控制的关注，又实现了外延充分性。