This paper explores the relationship between phenomenal properties and intentional properties. In recent years a number of philosophers have argued that intentional properties are sometimes necessitated by phenomenal properties, but have not explained why or how. Exceptions can be found in the work of Katalin Farkas and Farid Masrour, who develop versions of reductionism regarding phenomenally-necessitated intentionality (or ‘phenomenal intentionality’). I raise two objections to reductive theories of the sort they develop. Then I propose a version of primitivism regarding phenomenal intentionality. I argue that primitivism avoids the pitfalls of reductionism while promising broad explanatory payoffs.

中文翻译：

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现象意向性：还原论与原始主义

本文探讨了现象属性和意向属性之间的关系。近年来，许多哲学家认为，意向属性有时是现象属性所必需的，但没有解释为什么或如何。在 Katalin Farkas 和 Farid Masrour 的工作中可以找到例外，他们开发了关于现象必要的意向性（或“现象意向性”）的还原论版本。我对他们发展的那种还原理论提出了两个反对意见。然后我提出一个关于现象意向性的原始主义版本。我认为原始主义避免了还原论的陷阱，同时承诺了广泛的解释性回报。