Following the 2007–9 financial crisis, the EU strengthened its institutional apparatus for bank regulation, creating a trio of sectoral bodies, including the European Banking Authority (EBA). Various aspects of this new system have been studied, but to date, little is known about how banks engage with their new supranational regulator. We argue that such engagement fosters an interdependence between banks and regulators, thus contributing to the efficiency and robustness of the overall regulatory regime; but also that it is contingent on the regulator exhibiting the qualities of credibility, legitimacy, and transparency. These qualities are grounded in the domestic regulatory governance literature, but we suggest that they are rendered problematic by the complexities of the EU's multilevel system and, in particular, the overlap in competences between the EBA and the European Central Bank. We examine the EBA in the light of these criteria and find that banks’ engagement remains pitched towards established national regulators and the EU's legislative arena. This poses concerns for the efficacy of agency governance in the EU's regulatory regime for banking.

中文翻译：

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多层次监管治理：在欧洲银行管理局建立银行与监管机构的关系

在 2007-9 年金融危机之后，欧盟加强了其银行监管机构，创建了三个部门机构，包括欧洲银行管理局 (EBA)。这个新系统的各个方面已经被研究过，但迄今为止，人们对银行如何与新的超国家监管机构互动知之甚少。我们认为，这种参与促进了银行和监管机构之间的相互依赖，从而有助于提高整体监管制度的效率和稳健性；但也取决于监管机构表现出的可信度、合法性和透明度。这些品质以国内监管治理文献为基础，但我们认为它们因欧盟多层次系统的复杂性而存在问题，特别是，EBA 和欧洲中央银行的职能重叠。我们根据这些标准检查了 EBA，发现银行的参与仍然倾向于既定的国家监管机构和欧盟的立法领域。这引起了人们对欧盟银行业监管制度中机构治理有效性的担忧。