After the subprime financial crisis, the countries who were worst affected set about reforming legacy financial regulations. Given multiple similarities in the way they experienced the crisis and the similar complexions of their post-crisis economies and politics, the contrast between the UK and the Netherlands' approaches to breaking up their largest banks presents a puzzle for prevailing theories in the politics of financial regulation. Both countries explored a range of reform options using similar expert committees, but while UK policymakers determined that commercial and investment operations should be ring-fenced in the largest British banks, the Dutch reform program centered on the banks’ own recommendations to change banking culture from the bottom up by developing a code of conduct and banker's oath. The paper traces this divergence to two related effects produced by the countries’ contrasting majoritarian and consensus party systems: power sharing and coalition formation. Under conditions of high issue salience, both worked to encourage British policymakers to prioritize reform, while in the Netherlands each factor reduced party political responsiveness and de-emphasized alternatives to the banks’ own reform prescriptions. The paper ultimately suggests that institutional democratic variables are worthy of greater recognition among scholars of business power and financial regulation.

中文翻译：

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更换银行或银行家？英国和荷兰的系统性政治（中）行动和危机后银行业改革

次贷危机后，受影响最严重的国家着手改革遗留的金融监管。鉴于它们在经历危机的方式上有多种相似之处，以及危机后经济和政治的相似情况，英国和荷兰在拆分其最大银行的方法上的对比为金融政治中的流行理论提出了一个难题。规定。两国都使用类似的专家委员会探索了一系列改革方案，但尽管英国政策制定者认为商业和投资业务应在英国最大的银行中进行隔离，但荷兰的改革计划以银行自身的建议为中心，将银行文化从通过制定行为准则和银行家誓言自下而上。该论文将这种分歧归因于这些国家不同的多数党和共识党制度产生的两个相关影响：权力分享和联盟形成。在问题高度突出的情况下，两者都努力鼓励英国政策制定者优先考虑改革，而在荷兰，每个因素都降低了政党的政治反应能力，并不再强调银行自身改革方案的替代方案。该论文最终表明，制度民主变量值得商业权力和金融监管学者更多地认可。而在荷兰，每个因素都降低了政党的政治反应能力，并不再强调银行自身改革方案的替代方案。该论文最终表明，制度民主变量值得商业权力和金融监管学者更多地认可。而在荷兰，每个因素都降低了政党的政治反应能力，并不再强调银行自身改革方案的替代方案。该论文最终表明，制度民主变量值得商业权力和金融监管学者更多地认可。