Abstract Senator Ted Cruz’s campaign for the Republican presidential nomination again raised the question whether persons who receive citizenship at birth to American parents abroad are natural born and eligible to the presidency. This article uses Supreme Court decisions and previously overlooked primary source material from the Founders, the First Congress and English and British law to show that they are not natural born under the doctrinal or historical meaning of the term. The relevant constitutional distinction is between citizenship acquired by birth or by naturalization, not at birth or afterward. It argues further that a living constitutional theory cannot justifiably interpret the term more broadly because derivative citizenship statutes have long discriminated on grounds including race, gender, sexual orientation, and marital and socioeconomic status. The Supreme Court upholds them even though they would be unacceptable if applied to citizens because they merely discriminate against aliens. Moreover, many who assert presidential eligibility or other constitutional privilege for children born to American parents abroad intend to favor traditionally dominant groups or rely on political theories of bloodline transmission of national character that the Supreme Court used to justify its infamous decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford. No justifiable living interpretation can incorporate such discrimination or discredited political theories in qualifications for the highest office in the land. The article examines the meaning of the term “natural born” in the broader context of similar discrimination in English and British law from which American law developed. It acknowledges the difficulty of reconciling centuries of derivative nationality law and practice with our highest constitutional ideals of equal protection of the law. It concludes by identifying threshold requirements for and a possible approach to developing a justifiable living constitutional interpretation of natural born derivative citizenship.

中文翻译：

---

走向天生的衍生公民身份

摘要泰德·克鲁兹（Ted Cruz）参议员竞选共和党总统候选人时，再次提出了一个问题，即在国外获得美国父母的父母出生时获得公民身份的人是否自然出生并有资格担任总统职位。本文使用最高法院的判决以及先前被创始人，第一届国会以及英国和英国法律所忽略的主要原始材料，以表明根据该术语的理论或历史含义，它们并非自然而然的。宪法上的相关区别是出生或入籍而不是出生时或出生后获得的公民身份之间的区别。它进一步指出，现行的宪法理论不能合理地更广泛地解释该术语，因为长期以来，基于种族，性别，性取向，以及婚姻和社会经济地位。最高法院维持了这些原则，即使将它们应用于公民也是不可接受的，因为它们仅歧视外国人。此外，许多主张对在美国的美国父母所生的孩子享有总统资格或其他宪法特权的人，倾向于偏爱传统上占主导地位的群体，或依靠具有民族特征的血统传播的政治理论，最高法院在其理论上证明了其在Dred Scott v。桑福德。没有正当的生活解释可以将这种歧视或不道德的政治理论纳入该国最高职务的资格。本文在美国法从其产生的英英法中类似歧视的更广泛背景下考察了“自然出生”一词的含义。它承认使数百年来的派生国籍法与实践与我们对法律的平等保护的最高宪法理想协调一致的困难。最后，通过确定对自然出生的衍生公民身份进行合理的生活宪法解释的门槛要求和可能的方法。