Abstract This article examines the relationship between Politics and Law in U.S. Supreme Court decision-making. It argues that three major developments in recent decades have combined to undermine the Court’s status as a legal and judicial institution, and instead define it as political actor, motivated by ideology and the personal policy predilections of the Court’s Justices. The first of these elements is the increasingly political and partisan nature of the Supreme Court appointment process, as witnessed by the recent Gorsuch and Kavanaugh nominations. The behaviour of the President and Senators in these controversial appointments conclusively demonstrates that the country’s leading politicians view the Court as primarily a political body rather than a legal one. The second element of the assault on the Court’s status as a judicial institution is the rise in influence of the behaviouralist school of Supreme Court analysis. Beginning with the work of academics such as Glendon Schubert, the behaviouralists employed new methods and theories in an attempt to debunk the Legal Model of Supreme Court decision-making and to replace it with what is known today as the Attitudinal Model. It forcibly argues that Supreme Court Justices are political in intent and decision, with legal language and arguments being no more than judicial camouflage to disguise their true nature. This applies equally to both conservative and liberal justices. The article identifies the third element of the assault on the status of the Court as a legal institution as coming from Originalist scholars, activists and judges who accuse liberal Justices of having abandoned traditional interpretive methods in favour of redefining the language of the Constitution to suit their progressive political agenda. Originalists acknowledge that their own interpretive methods may lead to results deemed unacceptable to contemporary Americans, but argue that it the duty of the political branches of government, not the courts, to modernise policy and practice. This article concludes that while Originalism has genuine appeal as a theory of interpretation, it is nevertheless both impractical and undesirable. Moreover, rather than returning the Court to the Legal Model, the Originalist campaign has only served to persuade many that the Attitudinal Model is an accurate one. However, the article also argues that the break with Originalism by the Warren Court over segregation has developed into a wholesale change in the Court’s role in American government, one that ill-becomes the unelected judiciary in a representative democracy. It is argued here that the best way to restore the legal and judicial identity of the Court would be a return to the emphasis on ‘judicial role’, once championed by great jurists such as Learned Hand, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis and John Harlan II. Judicial modesty and restraint would distinguish the Court from the political branches of American government. The Court should decide less and only where the case for a decision of unconstitutionality is very clear and very compelling.

中文翻译：

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政治与宪法：没有区别的区别？

摘要本文探讨了美国最高法院决策中的政治与法律之间的关系。它认为，近几十年来的三项重大发展共同破坏了法院作为法律和司法机构的地位，而是将其定义为政治角色，这是受意识形态和法院大法官个人政策倾向的驱使。这些要素中的第一个是最高法院任命程序的政治性和党派性日益增强，最近的戈苏奇和卡瓦诺提名就证明了这一点。总统和参议员在这些有争议的任命中的举动最终表明，该国的主要政治人物将法院视为主要的政治机构，而不是合法的机构。侵犯法院作为司法机构地位的第二个因素是最高法院分析的行为主义学派的影响力增强。从格伦登·舒伯特（Glendon Schubert）等学者的工作开始，行为主义者就采用了新的方法和理论，试图揭穿最高法院决策的法律模型，并以今天称为态度模型的模型代替。它强辩称，最高法院大法官具有政治意图和决定力，法律语言和论据不过是掩饰其真实性质的司法伪装。这同样适用于保守派和自由派法官。这篇文章指出了来自原始主义学者的关于法院作为法律机构地位的攻击的第三个要素，指责自由主义大法官放弃传统解释方法以重新定义宪法语言以适应其渐进政治议程的激进主义者和法官。原始主义者承认，他们自己的解释方法可能会导致当代美国人认为无法接受的结果，但他们认为，政府的政治部门而不是法院有责任现代化政策和实践。本文的结论是，尽管原始主义作为一种解释理论具有真正的吸引力，但它既不切实际，又不受欢迎。此外，原始主义运动并没有让法院恢复法律模式，而只是说服了许多人，态度模式是一个准确的模式。然而，文章还认为，与原旨在隔离打破由沃伦法院已经发展成为法院在美国政府的角色，一个虐待成为非民选的司法机关在代议制民主批发变化。有人认为，恢复法院的法律和司法身份的最佳方法是恢复对“司法作用”的重视，而这种学习曾被Learned Hand，Oliver Wendell Holmes，Louis Brandeis和John Harlan等伟大的法学家所拥护。二。司法上的谦虚与克制将使法院与美国政府的政治部门区别开来。法院应少作出决定，只有在作出违宪决定的理由非常明确和令人信服的情况下，才应作出较少的决定。一个虐待成为非民选的司法机关在代议制民主。有人认为，恢复法院的法律和司法身份的最佳方法是恢复对“司法作用”的重视，而这种学习曾被Learned Hand，Oliver Wendell Holmes，Louis Brandeis和John Harlan等伟大的法学家所拥护。二。司法上的谦虚与克制将使法院与美国政府的政治部门区别开来。法院应少作出决定，只有在作出违宪决定的理由非常明确和令人信服的情况下，才应作出较少的决定。一个虐待成为非民选的司法机关在代议制民主。有人认为，恢复法院的法律和司法身份的最佳方法是恢复对“司法作用”的重视，而这种学习曾被Learned Hand，Oliver Wendell Holmes，Louis Brandeis和John Harlan等伟大的法学家所拥护。二。司法上的谦虚与克制将使法院与美国政府的政治部门区别开来。法院应少作出决定，只有在作出违宪决定的理由非常明确和令人信服的情况下，才应作出较少的决定。路易斯·布兰代斯（Louis Brandeis）和约翰·哈兰（John Harlan II）。司法上的谦虚与克制将使法院与美国政府的政治部门区别开来。法院应少作出决定，只有在作出违宪决定的理由非常明确和令人信服的情况下，才应作出较少的决定。路易斯·布兰代斯（Louis Brandeis）和约翰·哈兰（John Harlan II）。司法上的谦虚与克制将使法院与美国政府的政治部门区别开来。法院应少作出决定，只有在作出违宪决定的理由非常明确和令人信服的情况下，才应作出较少的决定。