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Klossowski and Wittgenstein on Sensation and Privacy
Axiomathes ( IF 0.5 ) Pub Date : 2020-06-01 , DOI: 10.1007/s10516-020-09492-w
Conor Husbands

This paper compares the treatment of private sensations in the works of Wittgenstein and Klossowski. Its aim is to show that, despite the differences between their traditions and methods, they align in at least one important respect: rejecting relations of reference between signs and private sensations. The paper briefly contextualises their lines of attack on these relations, situating the two thinkers’ commonalities amidst what are undeniably divergent wider purposes. It proceeds to argue for two more specific conclusions. Firstly, Klossowski’s own rejoinder directed at reference to private sensations is rooted in his comparison of linguistic meaning to economic valuation in Living Currency. Secondly, Klossowski goes beyond Wittgenstein in arguing that, regardless of the status of reference of this sort, no complete account of sensation can view it only as private.



中文翻译:

Klossowski 和 Wittgenstein 关于感觉和隐私

本文比较了维特根斯坦和克洛索夫斯基作品中对私人感觉的处理。它的目的是表明,尽管他们的传统和方法之间存在差异,但他们至少在一个重要方面保持一致:拒绝符号和私人感觉之间的参照关系。这篇论文简要介绍了他们对这些关系的攻击路线,将两位思想家的共同点置于不可否认的不同的更广泛目的之中。它继续论证两个更具体的结论。首先,Klossowski 自己针对私人感觉的反驳植根于他在Living Currency中将语言意义与经济价值进行比较. 其次,克洛索夫斯基超越维特根斯坦的观点认为,无论这种参照的地位如何,没有完整的感觉描述只能将其视为私人的。

更新日期:2020-06-01
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