According to Adams (Inquiry 8:166–197, 1965), the acceptability of an indicative conditional goes with the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. However, some conditionals seem to be inappropriate, although their corresponding conditional probability is high. These are cases with a missing link between antecedent and consequent. Other conditionals are appropriate even though the conditional probability is low. Finally, we have the so-called biscuit conditionals. In this paper we will generalize analyses of Douven (Synthese 164:19–44, 2008) and others to account for the appropriateness of conditionals in terms of evidential support. Our generalization involves making use of Value , or intensity. We will show how this generalization helps to account for biscuit conditionals and conditional threats and promises. Finally, a link is established between this analysis of conditionals and an analysis of generic sentences.

中文翻译：

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条件作为代表性推论

根据亚当斯 (Inquiry 8:166–197, 1965)，指示性条件的可接受性与给定前因的结果的条件概率相一致。然而，一些条件似乎并不合适，尽管它们对应的条件概率很高。在这些情况下，前因和后因之间缺少联系。即使条件概率很低，其他条件也是合适的。最后，我们有所谓的饼干条件。在本文中，我们将对 Douven (Synthese 164:19–44, 2008) 和其他人的分析进行概括，以解释条件句在证据支持方面的适当性。我们的概括涉及使用 Value 或强度。我们将展示这种概括如何帮助解释饼干条件和条件威胁和承诺。最后，