Presentism faces the following well-known dilemma: either the truth-value of past-tense claims depends on the non-existing past and cannot be said to supevene on being, or it supervenes on present reality and breaks our intuition which says that the true past-tense claims should not depend on any present aspect of reality. The paper shows that the solution to the dilemma offered by Kierland and Monton’s brute past presentism, the version of presentism according to which the past is supposed to be both a fundamental and present aspect of reality, is implausible and proposes how to cure presentism: the dillema can be avoided by taking a third road consisting of introducing dynamics into presentism in the form of the real passage of time. Dynamic presentism, which is constructed in such a way, can overcome the dilemma by providing an ontological basis for the past-tense propositions in the form of the real past. Dynamic presentism also offers a rationale for treating the future as being open.

中文翻译：

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蛮力过去现在论、动态现在论和存在-随附性反对

现在主义面临以下众所周知的困境：要么过去时声明的真值依赖于不存在的过去，不能说超越存在，要么它超越现在的现实并打破我们的直觉，即真实的过去时的主张不应依赖于现实的任何现在方面。该论文表明，基尔兰和蒙顿的粗暴的过去现在主义所提供的困境的解决方案是不可信的，并提出了如何治愈现在主义：可以通过采取第三条道路来避免困境，即以真实的时间流逝的形式将动态引入现在。以这种方式构建的动态呈现主义，可以通过以真实过去的形式为过去时命题提供本体论基础来克服困境。动态现在主义也为将未来视为开放提供了一个基本原理。