Modal Meinongianism provides the semantics of sentences involving intentional verbs Priest (Towards Nonbeing, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016 ). To that end, Modal Meinongianism employs a pointed non-normal quantified modal logic model. Like earlier Meinongian views Modal Meinongianism has a characterisation principle (QCP), that claims that any condition whatsoever is satisfied by some object in some world. Recently, Everett (The nonexistent, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, 169, p. 36) has proposed an argument against QCP that, if successful, gives rise to problems identical to those Russell (Mind 14:530–538, 1905, p. 533) raised for Naïve Meinongianism, namely that it allows for true contradictions, and allows us to define anything into existence. Everett claims that the ordinary meanings of “actual” license an inference pattern, such that if an object satisfies Actual A at some world, then that object satisfies A in the actual world. Given that actual world is the designated point of evaluation for truth simpliciter , QCP would fall prey to Russell’s criticisms. As opposed to Everett, I argue that, even if we grant Everett the assumption that “actual” is a modal indexical that rigidly refers to the actual world, it does not conform to the inference pattern above. This is because when an object satisfies Actual A at some world, this alters the assertoric force of “actual”, because “actual” is interpreted in the scope of some modal or intentional operator. I also explain that Everett’s proposed example carries existential commitment because the problematic noun-phrase occurs outside the scope of a modal or intentional operator.

中文翻译：

---

现在，想象一个实际存在的独角兽：罗素对模态美农主义的担忧

Modal Meinongianism 提供了涉及意向动词 Priest 的句子的语义（Towards Nonbeing，牛津大学出版社，牛津，2016 年）。为此，Modal Meinongianism 采用了一个有针对性的非正规量化模态逻辑模型。像早期的美农主义观点一样，模态美农主义有一个表征原则（QCP），它声称任何条件都被某个世界中的某个对象满足。最近，Everett（The nonexistent, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, 169, p. 36）提出了一个反对 QCP 的论点，如果成功，会引起与 Russell 相同的问题（Mind 14:530-538, 1905, p. 533) 为朴素美农主义提出，即它允许真正的矛盾，并允许我们定义任何事物的存在。埃弗雷特声称“实际”的普通含义许可推理模式，这样，如果一个对象在某个世界满足实际 A，那么该对象在现实世界中满足 A。鉴于现实世界是真实简化器的指定评估点，QCP 将成为罗素批评的牺牲品。与埃弗雷特相反，我认为，即使我们承认埃弗雷特“实际”是一种模态索引，它严格地指代现实世界，它也不符合上述推理模式。这是因为当一个对象在某个世界满足 Actual A 时，这会改变“actual”的断言力，因为“actual”在某个模态或意向算子的范围内被解释。我还解释说，埃弗雷特提出的例子带有存在主义承诺，因为有问题的名词短语出现在模态或有意运算符的范围之外。