Due to environmental externalities, micro-enterprises with profit-seeking features do not develop sufficient motivation for environmental governance. In a fiscally decentralized system, local environmental protection authorities perform environmental supervision, and the intensity of the regulations that they implement has an important influence on corporate environmental governance. Based on the promotion tournament framework, this paper aims to discuss the driving mechanism of corporate environmental governance using turnover of environmental protection department directors (EPDDs) as an indicator.,Using samples of A-share companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges from 2007 to 2014, this paper examines the impact of EPDD turnover on corporate environmental governance and its underlying mechanism.,The results show that corporate environmental governance exhibits a political periodicity that changes with the turnover of the EPDD, and the periodicity remains after controlling for the influence of changes in provincial party secretary and governor. Internal mechanisms analysis indicates that, without financial independence, local environmental protection departments rely on increasing sewage charges, not environmental protection subsidies, to promote corporate environmental governance. Further, considering heterogeneity among officials, it finds that the younger a new EPDD is, the more pronounced the periodicity of corporate environmental governance. However, there is no significant difference between in-system and out-system turnover.,In general, this paper describes the mechanisms of corporate environmental governance from the perspective of political economics, and the results have implications for the potential improvement of the government’s environmental supervision functions and the development of ecological civilization in China.

中文翻译：

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企业环境治理的推动力

由于环境的外部性，具有营利性的微型企业没有为环境治理开发足够的动力。在财政分权的系统中，地方环境保护主管部门进行环境监督，其执行法规的强度对公司环境治理具有重要影响。本文基于推广锦标赛的框架，以环保部门主管的离职率为指标，探讨企业环境治理的驱动机制。以2007年沪深两市A股上市公司样本为样本到2014年，本文探讨了EPDD营业额对公司环境治理及其潜在机制的影响。结果表明，公司环境治理表现出随着EPDD营业额的变化而变化的政治周期，并且在控制了省委书记和省长变动的影响后，周期仍然存在。内部机制分析表明，在没有财务独立性的情况下，地方环境保护部门依靠增加排污费而不是环境保护补贴来促进企业环境治理。此外，考虑到官员之间的异质性，发现新的EPDD越年轻，公司环境治理的周期性就越明显。但是，系统内和系统外周转率之间没有显着差异。