Is good reasoning in the moral domain different from its counterpart in non-moral domains? What counts as a good moral argument, or a valid moral assertion or claim? What does ‘validity’ mean in the moral realm? Lots of ink has been spilled on these and related questions in the past few decades, but not much has been settled. In what follows I will spill a little more, this time with the hope that bringing epistemic concerns directly to bear on them might shed some light. A particular focus will be Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics and its conceptions of communicative rationality and ideal discourse. I will try to show that Habermas and some of his defenders in the philosophy of education literature fail to get the epistemology right and, as a result, both their defenses of Habermasian communicative rationality and critiques of non-Habermasian alternatives fail as well. I will also argue that these epistemic failures do not threaten their Habermas-based educational recommendations, which can be justified on other, more straightforwardly moral, grounds.

中文翻译：

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正义与正当化

道德领域中的良好推理与非道德领域中的对应物不同吗？什么才是好的道德论证，或者有效的道德主张或主张？在道德领域，“有效性”是什么意思？在过去的几十年里，关于这些和相关问题的墨水已经大量涌现，但没有多少得到解决。在接下来的内容中，我将多说一点，这次希望将认知关注直接应用于它们可能会有所启发。尤尔根·哈贝马斯 (Jürgen Habermas) 的话语伦理学及其对交际理性和理想话语的概念将特别关注。我将试图证明哈贝马斯和他的一些教育哲学哲学捍卫者未能正确理解认识论，因此，他们对哈贝马斯交流理性的辩护和对非哈贝马斯替代方案的批判也失败了。我还将争辩说，这些认知上的失败不会威胁到他们基于哈贝马斯的教育建议，这些建议可以在其他更直接的道德理由上得到证明。