In this article, I illuminate ongoing debates about the normative status of indoctrination via close examination of recent work in the philosophy of psychiatry and, more particularly, delusion. Here it has been argued, contrary to the established view that delusional states of mind are epistemically problematic, that delusions can (at least under certain circumstances) exhibit a quality called ‘epistemic innocence’. That is, they may ‘[deliver] a significant epistemic benefit, that could not be obtained otherwise’. This might lead us to wonder whether indoctrinated beliefs – which appear to share key features with delusional beliefs – might also be capable of such epistemic innocence and, if so, what the educational consequences of such a conclusion would be. By drawing meaningful distinctions between delusion and normal cognition, as well as expanding our notions of what is conducive to epistemic achievement, philosophers of psychiatry and psychopathology provide us with novel, empirically informed theoretical resources which are particularly well placed to facilitate better understanding of belief formation and malformation. As such, this work is of direct relevance to philosophers of education concerned with questions pertaining to the legitimate transmission of beliefs. I begin by briefly outlining my own outcome-based account of indoctrination before discussing some of the relevant similarities and differences between indoctrination and delusion. This is followed by a discussion of how the aforementioned shared features might motivate the conclusion that indoctrination is morally problematic. In the second half of the article, I shift my focus to the possible epistemic benefits of delusional beliefs, before going on to explain why none of the candidates for epistemically innocent forms of belief transmission can be properly described as indoctrination.

中文翻译：

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灌输、妄想和认识无罪的可能性

在这篇文章中，我通过仔细研究精神病学哲学，尤其是妄想的近期工作，阐明了关于灌输规范地位的持续辩论。这里有人认为，与妄想心理状态在认知上有问题的既定观点相反，妄想可以（至少在某些情况下）表现出一种称为“知识纯真”的品质。也就是说，它们可能“[提供]一个显着的认知好处，这是否则无法获得的”。这可能会让我们怀疑，被灌输的信念——似乎与妄想信念具有共同的关键特征——是否也可能具有这种认知上的无罪，如果是这样，这种结论的教育后果将是什么。通过在妄想和正常认知之间做出有意义的区分，除了扩展我们关于什么有利于认知成就的概念之外，精神病学和精神病理学哲学家为我们提供了新颖的、经验丰富的理论资源，这些资源特别适合促进对信念形成和畸形的更好理解。因此，这项工作与关注与信仰的合法传播有关的问题的教育哲学家直接相关。在讨论灌输与妄想之间的一些相关异同之前，我首先简要概述了我自己基于结果的灌输解释。随后讨论了上述共同特征如何促使人们得出灌输在道德上有问题的结论。在文章的后半部分，