This study examines the possible opposing effects of the board function of busyness (i.e. the presence of busy independent non-executive directors serving on multiple boards) on bank dividend payout patterns between two alternative payouts models (i.e. conventional and Islamic). Using an international sample for listed banks during the periods of 2006–2018, we show that the busyness of boards of directors can explain differential dividend payouts behaviour between two banking systems. For conventional banking dividend model, a busy board has a significantly positive impact on the bank’s dividend payout level. However, during the financial crisis of 2007/2009, the positive impact of board busyness on dividends payouts is tempered for these banks. In contrast, Islamic banks operating under a more constrained dividend model, report significantly lower levels of payouts and lower likelihood when they have busy directors on board. We find insignificant evidence for the effect of the financial crisis in Islamic banks. These results highlight a potential challenge for the unique agency conflicts arising from the complex payout model of Islamic banks (in terms of profit distribution principles, motives, mechanics and techniques, and flexibility of payouts), which is subject to the demand for greater monitoring and additional rulings when compared to the conventional.

中文翻译：

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董事会的忙碌和对替代银行股息模型的新见解

本研究考察了董事会的忙碌功能（即忙碌的独立非执行董事在多个董事会任职）对两种替代支付模式（即传统和伊斯兰）之间的银行股息支付模式可能产生的相反影响。使用 2006-2018 年期间上市银行的国际样本，我们表明董事会的忙碌可以解释两个银行系统之间的差异派息行为。对于传统的银行股利模型，忙碌的董事会对银行的股利支付水平有显着的积极影响。然而，在 2007/2009 年的金融危机期间，董事会繁忙对这些银行的派息产生的积极影响有所减弱。相比之下，伊斯兰银行在更严格的股息模式下运营，当董事会有忙碌的董事时，他们报告的支出水平和可能性会显着降低。我们发现金融危机对伊斯兰银行的影响微不足道。这些结果凸显了伊斯兰银行复杂的支付模式（在利润分配原则、动机、机制和技术以及支付的灵活性方面）所产生的独特代理冲突的潜在挑战，这需要加强监督和与传统规则相比，附加规则。