Bank Holding Companies and in particular their internal capital markets have been widely discussed in recent financial literature. The financial crisis especially brought regulatory intervention in financial markets into question. Empirical evidence suggests that bank holding companies have clear preferences for double leverage, which are not based on unambiguous and explicit economic foundations. In this article, we analyze the effects of equity, debt and double leverage on the efficiency of bank holding companies. We show that Bank Holding Company efficiency is negatively affected by equity financing from parents to subsidiaries and this effect is even more pronounced in case of double leveraging. Our findings indicate that further measures from regulators are necessary in order to prevent inefficient financing via double leverage, which may be used to circumvent regulatory capital requirements.

中文翻译：

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内部资本市场与银行控股公司效率

最近的金融文献中广泛讨论了银行控股公司，尤其是它们的内部资本市场。金融危机尤其使金融市场的监管干预受到质疑。经验证据表明，银行控股公司对双重杠杆有着明显的偏好，这并非基于明确明确的经济基础。在本文中，我们分析了股权、债务和双重杠杆对银行控股公司效率的影响。我们表明银行控股公司效率受到母子公司股权融资的负面影响，这种影响在双重杠杆的情况下更加明显。我们的研究结果表明，监管机构需要采取进一步措施，以防止通过双重杠杆进行低效融资，