We study the impact of institutional investors’ “voice” on 201 going private tender offers by controlling shareholders (“freeze-out” offers) in Israel. Israeli regulatory intervention in freeze-out tender offers is relatively mild; thus, institutional investors’ activism becomes crucial. We find that institutional voice has dual effects. On one hand, when there are pre-negotiations with institutional investors’ (their voice is heard), accepted offers’ premiums increase. On the other hand, when institutional investors express their voice, yet reject the offer, these rejections appear to hurt shareholders’ value. We also document significant institutional investor exit after rejected offers, especially after offers preceded by voice (pre-negotiations with institutional investors).

中文翻译：

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机构投资者的声音对冻结要约收购的条款和结果的影响

我们研究了机构投资者的“声音”对以色列控股股东进行的 201 次私有化要约收购（“冻结”要约）的影响。以色列对冻结收购要约的监管干预相对温和；因此，机构投资者的积极性变得至关重要。我们发现机构声音具有双重影响。一方面，当与机构投资者（他们的声音被听到）进行预先谈判时，接受报价的溢价会增加。另一方面，当机构投资者表达他们的意见，但拒绝要约时，这些拒绝似乎损害了股东的价值。我们还记录了在报价被拒绝后的重大机构投资者退出，尤其是在报价之前（与机构投资者进行预谈判）之后。