We empirically assess international corporate tax avoidance by strategic location of innovative output. The analysis draws on the universe of patent applications to the European Patent Office from 1990 to 2006 linked with data on multinational entities (MNEs) in Europe. Four findings emerge: first, patent holdings are distorted toward low-tax countries. Second, patent location in low-tax countries is correlated with a geographic separation of research and development output and input. Third, MNEs systematically sort high-value (low-value) patents to low-tax (high-tax) countries. Fourth, the propensity to locate patent ownership in low-tax countries is significantly decreased if controlled foreign company rules are enacted in the MNE’s parent country. The tightening of transfer pricing legislation, in turn, exerts a weak negative effect on the location of patent ownership only.

中文翻译：

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公司税、专利转移和反避税规则：经验证据

我们通过创新产出的战略位置来实证评估国际公司避税。该分析借鉴了 1990 年至 2006 年向欧洲专利局提交的与欧洲跨国实体 (MNE) 数据相关的专利申请范围。出现了四个发现：首先，专利持有被扭曲到低税收国家。其次，低税收国家的专利所在地与研发产出和投入的地理分离相关。第三，跨国公司系统地将高价值（低价值）专利分类到低税收（高税收）国家。第四，如果在跨国公司的母国颁布受控外国公司规则，将专利所有权置于低税收国家的倾向会显着降低。转让定价立法的收紧，反过来，