This article examines to what extent taxation authority should be delegated to local or lower-level government. Delegation of taxation authority can be regarded as a commitment to the local tax rate ex ante in a decentralized leadership model, in which local governments set policies ex ante and the central government decides transfer policies ex post. Previous papers point out that ex post interregional transfers of the central government distort ex ante regional policies of local governments. However, Silva clarify the case where efficient expenditure by local governments is achieved. This article examines the delegation of taxation authority by extending Silva’s model to include commitment to taxation and generally derives the conditions when efficient public expenditure by local governments can be achieved in relation to the delegation of taxation authority. The model adopted in this article allows various levels of spillovers of local public goods and various types of multipolicy commitments of taxation and/or expenditure.

中文翻译：

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去中心化领导模式下的税收权力下放与多元政策承诺

本文探讨了应在多大程度上将税收权力下放给地方或下级政府。在分散的领导模式下，税收权力下放可以看作是对地方税率的事前承诺，其中地方政府事前制定政策，中央政府事后决定转移政策。以前的论文指出，中央政府事后跨区域转移扭曲了地方政府事前区域政策。然而，席尔瓦澄清了地方政府有效支出的情况。本文通过将席尔瓦的模型扩展为包括对税收的承诺来研究税收权力的下放，并总体上推导出与税收权力下放相关的地方政府可以实现有效公共支出的条件。本文采用的模型允许不同程度的地方公共产品外溢和不同类型的税收和/或支出的多元政策承诺。