Abstract Why is global economic governance often marked by controversies among EU member states despite their commitment to joint action? European members of the G20 diverge over public debt to stimulate growth and over global trade imbalances. These issues express differences in economic interests, such as competitiveness, as well as ideational divergences regarding deficit spending and the role of the government in steering the economy. Therefore, domestic politics theories seem to constitute a necessary complement to integration theories in explaining European governments’ preferences. In applying the societal approach, I argue that domestic value-based ideas and material interests shape governmental preferences in international political economy. In doing so, ideas prevail when fundamental economic policy issues such as public debt are at stake, while interests prevail, when governance directly affects the costs and benefits of specific economic sectors. These arguments are analysed by comparing the domestic politics of British, French, German and Italian positions towards two policy debates in the G20.

中文翻译：

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欧洲偏好全球经济治理的国内政治

摘要 为什么欧盟成员国承诺联合行动，但全球经济治理却经常出现争议？G20 的欧洲成员在公共债务刺激增长和全球贸易失衡问题上存在分歧。这些问题表达了经济利益的差异，例如竞争力，以及关于赤字支出和政府在引导经济中的作用的观念分歧。因此，在解释欧洲政府的偏好时，国内政治理论似乎是对一体化理论的必要补充。在应用社会方法时，我认为基于国内价值的观念和物质利益塑造了政府在国际政治经济中的偏好。在这样做，当公共债务等基本经济政策问题受到威胁时，观念盛行，而当治理直接影响特定经济部门的成本和收益时，利益盛行。通过比较英国、法国、德国和意大利对 G20 中两次政策辩论的国内政治立场来分析这些论点。