Abstract In this article, we propose a neurophenomenological account of what moods are, and how they work. We draw upon phenomenology to show how mood attunes a person to a space of significant possibilities. Mood structures a person’s lived experience by fixing the kinds of significance the world can have for them in a given situation. We employ Karl Friston’s free-energy principle to show how this phenomenological concept of mood can be smoothly integrated with cognitive neuroscience. We will argue that mood is a consequence of acting in the world with the aim of minimizing expected free energy—a measure of uncertainty about the future consequences of actions. Moods summarize how the organism is faring overall in its predictive engagements, tuning the organism’s expectations about how it is likely to fare in the future. Agents that act to minimize expected free energy will have a feeling of how well or badly they are doing at maintaining grip on the multiple possibilities that matter to them. They will have what we will call a ‘feeling of grip’ that structures the possibilities they are ready to engage with over long time-scales, just as moods do.

中文翻译：

---

情绪如何调整预测：情绪及其严重抑郁症的神经现象学解释

摘要在本文中，我们提出了关于情绪是什么以及它们如何工作的神经现象学说明。我们利用现象学来显示情绪如何将一个人调和为一个具有巨大可能性的空间。情绪通过固定世界在给定情况下对他们具有的意义来构建人的生活经验。我们采用卡尔·弗里斯顿（Karl Friston）的自由能原理来说明这种现象学的情绪概念如何与认知神经科学顺利整合。我们将争辩说，情绪是在世界上行动的结果，目的是最大程度地减少预期的自由能，这是对行动未来后果的不确定性度量。情绪总结了有机体在其预测性活动中的整体表现，调整了有机体对未来可能表现的期望。采取行动以最小化预期自由能的代理人会感觉到，他们在保持对他们重要的多种可能性的控制方面做得有多好。他们将拥有我们称之为“抓地力”的感觉，这种情绪构造了他们准备好长期参与的可能性，就像情绪一样。