One of the vital issues in the discourse on the Anthropocene is the problem of material or bodily agency. Agency has long been the exclusive attribute of human consciousness and intentionality, but now the boundary between humans and nonhumans, mind and body, has become problematic. How might we reconceptualize agency? This article attempts to answer that question by working through Bruno Latour's posthuman configuration of agency. Latour's plea to reject not only consciousness but also intentionality conflicts with his animistic vision. What we need is not to dismiss intentionality in toto but to dehumanize it and acknowledge that there is a nonhuman form of intentionality. The intentionality that he wrongly paired with consciousness is a restricted and derived version of bodily intentionality. The body is not inert matter but is animate and intentional, for it is an endeavor to continue in its being. This article argues that there is no animism without such intentionality and that Latour's animism will become indistinguishable from mechanism as long as Latour fails to acknowledge animism’s intentionality.

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人类世中的非人类能动性和身体意向性问题

关于人类世的论述中的重要问题之一是物质或身体能动性的问题。能动性长期以来一直是人类意识和意向性的专属属性，但现在人类与非人类、心灵与身体之间的界限变得有问题。我们如何重新定义代理？本文试图通过布鲁诺·拉图尔 (Bruno Latour) 的后人类机构配置来回答这个问题。拉图尔不仅拒绝意识而且拒绝意向性的请求与他的万物有灵论观点相冲突。我们需要的不是完全摒弃意向性，而是将其非人化并承认存在一种非人类形式的意向性。他错误地与意识配对的意向性是身体意向性的受限和派生版本。身体不是惰性物质，而是有生命的和有意识的，因为它是一种继续存在的努力。本文认为，没有这种意向性就没有万物有灵论，只要拉图尔不承认万物有灵论的意向性，拉图尔的万物有灵论就会与机械论无法区分。