This article sheds light on a surprisingly persistent gap in economic theory: Economists have extensively studied agency relationships between principals and agents, but economic analysis has traditionally been preoccupied with problems created by agents rather than principals. Principal‐agent theory traditionally neglects opportunism on part of the principals. As a result, economic theory fails to fully explain gaps in economic performance. Even worse, the for decades biased concept of opportunism has shaped generations of students in economics and business and thus has contributed to deficient managerial and economic outcomes. Under the presumption that not only agents but also principals demonstrate opportunistic behavior, the economic definition of opportunism as established by Oliver Williamson is further developed. This contribution extends the concept of opportunism to principals. The principal’s illegitimate interference with the autonomy of the agent is discussed which shows that whilst agent opportunism largely rests on information asymmetry, principal opportunism feeds itself off power asymmetries. In an interdisciplinary effort and building on recent research in the area of bullying and mobbing, the economic rationale of principal opportunism is explained with the help of a simple game‐theoretic model. On this basis, it is demonstrated how a more balanced perception of principal agent relationships can contribute to an updated theory of the firm.

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机会主义校长

这篇文章揭示了经济理论中一个令人惊讶的持续存在的差距：经济学家广泛研究了委托人和代理人之间的代理关系，但经济分析传统上专注于由代理人而不是委托人造成的问题。委托代理理论传统上忽视了部分委托人的机会主义。因此，经济理论无法完全解释经济表现的差距。更糟糕的是，几十年来带有偏见的机会主义概念塑造了几代经济学和商业学生，从而导致管理和经济成果不足。在不仅代理人而且委托人都表现出机会主义行为的假设下，奥利弗威廉姆森建立的机会主义的经济学定义得到进一步发展。这一贡献将机会主义的概念扩展到了校长。讨论了委托人对代理人自治的非法干预，这表明代理人机会主义主要依赖于信息不对称，而委托人机会主义则以权力不对称为食。在一项跨学科的努力中，并以欺凌和围攻领域的最新研究为基础，借助简单的博弈论模型解释了主要机会主义的经济原理。在此基础上，证明了对委托代理关系的更平衡的看法如何有助于更新公司理论。主要的机会主义以权力不对称为食。在一项跨学科的努力中，并以欺凌和围攻领域的最新研究为基础，借助简单的博弈论模型解释了主要机会主义的经济原理。在此基础上，证明了对委托代理关系的更平衡的看法如何有助于更新公司理论。主要的机会主义以权力不对称为食。在一项跨学科的努力中，并以欺凌和围攻领域的最新研究为基础，借助简单的博弈论模型解释了主要机会主义的经济原理。在此基础上，证明了对委托代理关系的更平衡的看法如何有助于更新公司理论。