Who punishes leaders via coups during civil war? By distinguishing between different types of internal audiences within the government and their attempts to remove a leader forcefully, I illuminate the mechanisms that explain variation in who punishes the leader during wartime. I claim that whether leaders are culpable for the initiation of the war has an important implication for whether they are punished by members of the ruling coalition (i.e., those with access to decision-making and political power), or by those outside the ruling coalition. Empirical evidence supports my hypotheses: (i) culpable leaders are more likely to experience coup attempts led by those outside the leaders’ ruling coalition, should the war go poorly; and (ii) nonculpable leaders are more likely to experience coups executed by members of their ruling coalition. The findings have important implications for how leaders respond to audience pressures as they consider whether to fight or settle.

中文翻译：

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谁惩罚领导者？内战期间的领导者可屈性和政变

谁在内战期间通过政变惩罚领导人？通过区分政府内部不同类型的内部听众和他们有力地罢免领导者的尝试，我阐明了解释战争期间谁惩罚领导者变化的机制。我声称，领导人是否应为发动战争而应受罪责，对他们是否受到执政联盟成员（即有权​​决策和拥有政治权力的成员）或受到执政联盟之外的成员的惩罚具有重要意义。 。经验证据支持我的假设：（i）如果战争进展不佳，有罪的领导人更有可能经历由领导人执政联盟之外的人领导的政变企图；（ii）无罪的领导人更有可能经历执政联盟成员发动的政变。