According to the resource curse theory, persistent violence in developing areas results from rebels’ ability to finance warfare with natural resource revenues. Surprisingly, this overlooks the complexities of raising revenue from a mobile mining population that values security as well as income. The literature thus neglects a fundamental question: what are the incentives of rebel groups to prevent or perpetuate conflict in mining areas? This paper delineates a rational to both increase and decrease violence. Protecting a mine should allow rebels to extract taxes in return. Simultaneously, to maintain this demand for security, rebels may need to destabilize the wider area. The hypotheses are tested with novel data on rebel taxation at over 3’000 artisanal mines in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Supporting the hypotheses, the results show that rebel-taxed mines appear exempt from violence nearby but imperiled at the perimeter.

中文翻译：

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在暴风雨的眼中：叛乱者对地雷的征税和暴力策略

根据资源诅咒理论，发展中地区持续的暴力活动是叛军利用自然资源收入为战争提供资金的能力造成的。令人惊讶的是，这忽略了从既重视安全又重视收入的流动采矿人口中增加收入的复杂性。因此，文献忽略了一个基本问题：反叛团体在矿区预防或持久冲突的动机是什么？本文描述了增加和减少暴力的合理性。保护地雷应允许叛乱者从中收取税收。同时，为了维持这种对安全的需求，叛军可能需要破坏更广阔地区的稳定。对这些假设进行了检验，并使用了有关刚果民主共和国东部超过3000处手工矿山的反叛税的新数据。支持假设