When rebel groups with state-building ambitions capture territory, who stays and why? Through semi-structured interviews and an original household survey in the Iraqi city of Mosul, which was controlled by the Islamic State for more than three years, I conduct a multi-method descriptive comparison of the characteristics of “stayers” against “leavers.” I test and find some quantitative and qualitative support for a theory of competitive governance: Civilians who perceived improvements in the quality of governance under IS rule—relative to the Iraqi state—were more likely to stay under IS rule than those who perceived no change or a deterioration, but displacement decisions are multi-causal, influenced by many factors including economic resources, social networks and family structures, information, threat perceptions, and ideology. These findings suggest that historical experiences with weak rule of law and bad governance by states may affect the attitudes and actions of civilians living under rebel governance.

中文翻译：

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反叛者统治下的竞争性治理和流离失所决定：来自伊拉克伊斯兰国的证据

当具有建国野心的叛乱组织占领领土时，谁留下来，为什么？通过半结构化访谈以及在伊拉克城市摩苏尔进行的原始住户调查，该城市由伊斯兰国控制了三年多，我对“逗留者”与“离开者”的特征进行了多方法的描述性比较。我测试并找到了竞争治理理论的定量和定性支持：与IS规则相比，与IS规则相比，与IS规则相比，IS规则下的治理质量得到改善的平民更有可能坚持IS规则。情况恶化，但流离失所的决定是多因的，受许多因素的影响，包括经济资源，社会网络和家庭结构，信息，威胁感和意识形态。