Existing scholarship shows that a history of military rule increases the risk of democratic breakdown. However, scholars overlook the fact that military rule takes two distinct forms: collegial and personalist military rule. I argue that the two types of military rule provide different structural settings for post-authoritarian contexts. Collegial military rule hands over more cohesive and hierarchical militaries to their subsequent democracies than personalist military rule. These militaries remain organized, politicized, and powerful in emerging democracies, which increases the risk of military intervention and coups. I hypothesize that collegial military rule poses a greater threat to the survival of the ensuing democracies than personalist military rule. Empirical analysis reveals that democracies after collegial military rule are more likely to collapse than other democracies, including those emerging from personalist military rule. This shows that the previous finding on the detrimental effect of military rule is largely driven by collegial military rule.

中文翻译：

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先前的军事统治和民主生存

现有的奖学金表明，军事统治的历史增加了民主崩溃的风险。但是，学者们忽略了军事统治采取两种不同形式的事实：合议和个人主义军事统治。我认为这两种军事统治为威权主义后的情况提供了不同的结构设置。与个人主义军事统治相比，大学军事统治将更多凝聚力和等级的军队移交给其后的民主国家。这些军队在新兴民主国家仍保持组织，政治化和强大，这增加了军事干预和政变的风险。我假设，合议制军事统治比随后的个人主义军事统治对随后的民主国家的生存构成更大的威胁。实证分析表明，合议制军事统治之后的民主制比其他民主制更容易崩溃，包括那些由个人主义军事统治兴起的民主制。这表明先前关于军事统治的不利影响的发现很大程度上是由合议军事统治所驱动的。