Cross-cultural differences in argumentation may be explained by the use of different norms of reasoning. However, some norms derive from, presumably universal, mathematical laws. This inconsistency can be resolved, by considering that some norms of argumentation, like Bayes theorem, are mathematical functions. Systematic variation in the inputs may produce culture-dependent inductive biases although the function remains invariant. This hypothesis was tested by fitting a Bayesian model to data on informal argumentation from Turkish and English cultures, which linguistically mark evidence quality differently. The experiment varied evidential marking and informant reliability in argumentative dialogues and revealed cross-cultural differences for both independent variables. The Bayesian model fitted the data from both cultures well but there were differences in the parameters consistent with culture-specific inductive biases. These findings are related to current controversies over the universality of the norms of reasoning and the role of normative theories in the psychology of reasoning.

中文翻译：

---

非正式论证的跨文化差异：规范，归纳性偏见和证据性

争论中的跨文化差异可以通过使用不同的推理规范来解释。但是，某些规范可能来自普遍的数学定律。通过考虑某些论证规范（例如贝叶斯定理）是数学函数，可以解决这种矛盾。尽管功能保持不变，但输入中的系统变化可能会产生与文化相关的归纳偏差。通过将贝叶斯模型与来自土耳其和英国文化的非正式论证的数据进行拟合来检验该假设，这在语言上对证据质量的标记不同。该实验在辩论中改变了证据标记和信息提供者的可靠性，并揭示了两个自变量的跨文化差异。贝叶斯模型很好地拟合了来自两种文化的数据，但是参数的差异与特定于文化的归纳偏差一致。这些发现与当前关于推理规范的普遍性和规范理论在推理心理学中的作用有关的争论有关。