This paper aims to enrich our understanding of whether mandatory IR adoption lures firm into misreporting or forces them to reduce it.,The empirical analysis is carried out based on the sample containing all publicly listed firms in South Africa. Many different rigorous econometric techniques are adopted to thoroughly evaluate whether corporate misreporting practices increase or decrease following the mandatory adoption of IR.,The empirical results reveal that mandatory IR disclosure results in a decline in the misreporting practices of firms. The authors further find that as firms increasingly comply with the IR guidelines, especially with the “Content Elements” and “Guiding Principles,” their misreporting levels decrease.,This study has implications for a wide range of stakeholders, especially for regulatory authorities, international policymakers and regulators, as well as users of integrated reports of listed firms on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).,Regulatory authorities should be aware of misreporting determinants to set adequate and fitting corporate reporting standards that restrict the opportunistic behaviour of managers and amend IR guidelines to make them more comprehensible for integrated report preparers, therefore improves the implementation of IR.,This study sheds light on the current state and consequences of IR adoption in South Africa before and after the mandatory IR disclosure requirement, thus, international policymakers and regulators can refer to the critical aspects in our findings when considering whether to support IR mandatory adoption in their markets.,This paper sheds light on the emerging debate over the usefulness of IR and the necessity of mandatorily adopting this new reporting framework. In addition, by showing that the mandatory adoption of IR significantly reduces corporate misreporting practices, we also contribute to the literature on corporate misreporting behaviour.

中文翻译：

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强制性综合报告披露和公司错误报告

本文旨在丰富我们对强制性IR采用是否会诱使公司误报或强迫他们减少误报的理解。基于包含南非所有公开上市公司的样本进行了实证分析。许多不同的严格计量经济学技术被用来彻底评估在强制采用投资者关系后公司错误报告行为是增加还是减少。实证结果表明，强制性投资者关系披露导致公司错误报告行为的减少。作者还发现，随着公司越来越多地遵守IR准则，尤其是“内容要素”和“指导原则”，其错误报告的水平就会降低。该研究对广泛的利益相关者，尤其是对监管机构具有影响，本文阐明了有关投资者关系的有用性和强制采用这一新报告框架的必要性的新辩论。此外，通过证明强制采用IR可以显着减少公司的错误举报行为，我们还为有关公司错误举报行为的文献做出了贡献。