This article aims to analyse the impact of structural adjustment programmes, widely known as the ‘neoliberal model’, on the resilience of authoritarianism during Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia, to uncover the possible outcomes of the embedded neoliberal and the authoritarian blending. To do this, it engages with two sets of broad questions. How did the Ben Ali regime continue to maintain the regime’s tight grip on power in Tunisia during a ‘neoliberal’ transformation which in theory aims at reducing state influence? What does the Tunisian example tell us about the nature of embedded neoliberalism and its links with authoritarianism in general? The article answers these questions through the analysis of the novel social policy institutions of economic restructuring that took place during the Ben Ali era, namely the National Solidarity Fund, the Tunisian Solidarity Bank and the National Employment Fund. It concludes that these new tools under ‘neoliberal’ transformation increased state intervention in both politics and the economy, and reproduced the societal dependence on the state. Such form of neoliberalism has helped to sustain authoritarianism, but at the same time led to its demise when the social contract in which selective social benefits were provided in exchange for political loyalty failed.

中文翻译：

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各种形式的嵌入：本·阿里领导下的突尼斯本土新自由主义威权主义

本文旨在分析结构调整计划（广为人知的“新自由主义模式”）对本·阿里突尼斯政权期间威权主义恢复力的影响，以揭示嵌入的新自由主义和威权主义融合的可能结果。为此，它涉及两组广泛的问题。在理论上旨在减少国家影响的“新自由主义”转型期间，本阿里政权如何继续保持政权对突尼斯政权的严密控制？关于嵌入的新自由主义的本质及其与一般威权主义的联系，突尼斯的例子告诉我们什么？本文通过分析本阿里时代发生的经济重组的新型社会政策机构，即国家团结基金，回答了这些问题。突尼斯团结银行和国家就业基金。结论是，这些“新自由主义”转型下的新工具增加了国家对政治和经济的干预，并再现了社会对国家的依赖。这种形式的新自由主义有助于维持威权主义，但同时也导致威权主义的消亡，因为在其中提供选择性社会福利以换取政治忠诚的社会契约失败了。