Do states join human rights treaties if they know that non-compliance can have tangible consequences? We contend that states are less likely to accede to such treaties, especially if they have an outside option. We investigate this in the context of accession to the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (or: Hague Convention), which regulates the adoption of children across borders. We theorize that the incentive to join the treaty is structured by the salience of, and likelihood of participation in, intercountry adoption: states with larger orphan populations should prefer the outside option, whereas the presence and pressure children’s rights NGOs should prompt states to join the convention. We employ new data on the presence of children’s rights NGOs and a Cox proportional hazards technique. We find support for our propositions, with a caveat: states with large orphan populations initially prefer to the outside option, but become more likely to join the convention over time. This suggests that NGOs can influence states to join treaties that have consequences—especially if they assist with the development of administrative infrastructure that meets treaty requirements.

中文翻译：

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加入的后果：关于跨国收养对儿童权利影响的海牙公约

如果国家知道不遵守会产生切实后果，是否会加入人权条约？我们认为国家不太可能加入此类条约，尤其是如果它们有外部选择。我们在加入《跨国收养方面保护儿童和合作海牙公约》（或：海牙公约）的背景下对此进行了调查，该公约规范了跨境收养儿童。我们的理论认为，加入条约的动机是由跨国收养的显着性和参与可能性构成的：孤儿人口较多的国家应该更喜欢外部选择，而儿童权利非政府组织的存在和压力应该促使国家加入习俗。我们采用有关儿童权利非政府组织存在的新数据和 Cox 比例风险技术。我们为我们的提议找到了支持，但有一个警告：拥有大量孤儿人口的州最初更喜欢外部选项，但随着时间的推移，他们更有可能加入公约。这表明非政府组织可以影响国家加入具有后果的条约——特别是如果它们协助发展符合条约要求的行政基础设施。