Corporations have conflicts of interest among shareholders, debtholders and directors, and, corporate law gives each party avenues to pursue others, while protecting themselves. While debtholders are exposed to excessive risk-taking by directors and abuse of limited liability by shareholders, they are protected by legal institutions like directors’ liabilities to third parties and piercing of the corporate veil. Shareholders are subject to the risk of veil-piercing and director negligence, but they are protected by derivative suits. And directors, while under threat of liability suits by debtholders and shareholders, are protected by the business judgement rule, liability exemption and liability insurance of directors and officers (D&O). This web of legal institutions comprises a dual structure of economic and psychological factors, built upon economic incentives but also upon such psychological factors as bounded rationality, the chilling effect, the desire for certainty, loss aversion and the sense of fairness. Any change in the balance will affect their behaviour; greater protection of directors, for example, provokes greater risk-taking, both economically and psychologically.

JEL: K22, G41, D91

公司在股东，债务人和董事之间存在利益冲突，并且公司法为每一方提供了在保护自己的同时追求他人的途径。尽管债务持有人面临董事过度冒险和股东滥用有限责任的风险，但债务人却受到法律机构的保护，例如董事对第三方的责任和揭开公司面纱的行为。股东有遭受面纱刺穿和董事过失的风险，但受到派生诉讼的保护。而且，董事在受到债务持有人和股东的责任诉讼威胁时，受到商业判断规则，董事和高级职员的责任豁免和责任保险（D＆O）的保护。这个法律机构网络包含经济和心理因素的双重结构，建立在经济激励措施的基础上，还建立在诸如有限理性，冷漠效应，对确定性的渴望，避免损失和公平感等心理因素上。余额的任何变化都会影响他们的行为；例如，对董事的更大保护会​​在经济和心理上引发更大的冒险精神。

JEL：K22，G41，D91