Building on Oliver E. Williamson’s work, this article lays the basis for a transaction cost theory of social enterprises. It is submitted that the more proprietary-centred the creation of value is, the lower the governance costs of economizing on bounded rationality to protect patrons from the hazard of opportunism. Since not all productive activities can be organized within the range of the lowest governance costs, a discrete structural analysis is developed, with different ranges of governance costs suitable for different purposes depending on the kinds of value creation intended and the class of patrons to be protected. Accepting higher governance costs is justified by preventing the exploitation of bargaining asymmetries at the expense of selected classes of patrons like disadvantaged customers and stakeholders at large, subject to what is feasible, or Williamson’s remediableness standard. JEL: D23, M14

中文翻译：

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从混合组织到社会目的等级：社会企业的交易成本经济学

本文以奥利弗·威廉姆森（Oliver E. Williamson）的工作为基础，为社会企业的交易成本理论奠定了基础。有人认为，价值创造的所有权越集中，节约有限理性以保护顾客免受机会主义危害的治理成本就越低。由于并非所有生产活动都可以在最低治理成本的范围内组织，因此进行了离散的结构分析，根据预期的价值创造类型和要保护的顾客类别，针对不同目的采用了不同范围的治理成本。通过防止利用讨价还价的不对称性而牺牲某些类别的顾客（例如处境不利的客户和利益相关者，遵守可行的条件或威廉姆森的补救标准。JEL：D23，M14