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With other people’s money: Campaign financing as an agency problem
Journal of General Management Pub Date : 2019-09-06 , DOI: 10.1177/0306307019861814
Marina Amado Bahia Gama 1 , Gisele Walczak Galilea 1 , Rodrigo Bandeira-de-Mello 2 , Rosilene Marcon 3
Affiliation  

Agency theory explanations for corporate political activity assume that managers distort resource allocation to invest in political connections to pursue personal benefits. While distorted resource allocations yield poor earning quality, we expect that companies with efficient governance may curb this opportunistic behavior. We used matching procedures to identify the effects of financing political campaigns on the earning quality of the firm. We assembled an original panel of listed firms in Brazil from 1998 to 2013. We found that firms that donated to electoral campaigns had a lower earning quality than nondonor firms. Firms with superior corporate governance instruments were able to reduce the harmful effects on earning quality. These results support the tenets of agency theory in explaining why firms engage in politics.

中文翻译:

与其他人的钱:竞选资金作为代理问题

对企业政治活动的代理理论解释认为管理者扭曲资源配置,投资于政治关系,以谋求个人利益。而扭曲的资源分配产生盈利质量差,我们预计公司与效率的治理可以遏制这种投机行为。我们使用匹配的程序,以确定对公司的盈利质量融资政治运动的影响。我们聚集在巴西上市公司的原装面板从1998年到2013年,我们发现,捐赠给竞选的企业有一个较低的盈利质量,比nondonor公司。具有超强的企业管理手段的企业能够减少对盈余质量的有害影响。这些结果支持代理理论在解释公司为何参与政治方面的原则。
更新日期:2019-09-06
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