Abstract

The European sovereign debt crisis and, more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic have revealed the European Economic and Monetary Union’s fragility, which essentially emanates from the inherent tension between a single monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policies. To cushion economic and financial shocks and sever the sovereign-bank doom loop, different proposals to create a common public debt security have been put forward, although none of them has so far seen the light of day. Building on pertinent economic and finance scholarship, this article reviews four promising safe asset proposals from a legal perspective: Sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS), E-bonds, Purple bonds, and Coronabonds. Rather than focusing on their feasibility under EU law or national constitutional law, this article compares the proposals from an investor perspective against the backdrop of the following formal and functional legal characteristics that render assets ‘safe’: governing law, dispute settlement forum, investor protection, and investor representation in sovereign debt restructurings. Against this backdrop, targeted recommendations on critical design elements of safe assets, with the aim of reconciling the economic policy objectives with the pertinent legal constraints, are advanced.

中文翻译：

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寻求欧洲安全资产-主权债券支持证券，电子债券，紫色债券和Coronabonds的比较法律分析

摘要

欧洲主权债务危机以及最近的COVID-19大流行揭示了欧洲经济与货币联盟的脆弱性，这主要源于单一货币政策与权力下放的财政政策之间的内在张力。为了缓解经济和金融冲击并切断主权银行的厄运循环，尽管提出了关于建立共同的公共债务担保的不同建议，但迄今还没有一个提议成为现实。本文基于相关的经济和金融奖学金，从法律角度审查了四个有前途的安全资产建议：主权债券支持证券（SBBS），电子债券，紫色债券和Coronabonds。与其关注欧盟法律或国家宪法所规定的可行性，本文从使资产“安全”的以下正式和功能性法律特征的背景下，从投资者的角度对建议进行了比较：治理法律，争端解决论坛，投资者保护和主权债务重组中的投资者代表。在这种背景下，针对安全资产的关键设计要素提出了有针对性的建议，目的是使经济政策目标与相关法律约束保持一致。