In a 1977 interview with Frederick Olafson, Marcuse denied that any aspect of Heidegger’s philosophy was redeemable, suggesting that its latent Nazism was clear to him ‘ex-post’. This tiny phrase raises a significant problem for Heideggerian scholarship: the equivocal nature of hindsight’s seeming clarity. Playing with the notion of disenchantment, I retrace Marcuse’s disenchantment with Heidegger, from the Olafson interview to their 1947–8 exchange of letters, to Marcuse’s little-known ‘German philosophy, 1871–1933’ and finally to Being and Time itself, to argue that Heidegger’s theory of death and guilt provides an answer to the problem of the ex-post: a way in which we can recreate from beginning to end the disenchanting story of how Heidegger’s Nazism informed his thought, yet still retrace from end to beginning the way in which Heidegger’s thought was fertile philosophical territory in the first place.

中文翻译：

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海德格尔与马尔库塞：祛魅的历史

在 1977 年与弗雷德里克·奥拉夫森 (Frederick Olafson) 的一次采访中，马尔库塞否认海德格尔哲学的任何方面都是可以赎回的，暗示其潜在的纳粹主义对他来说“事后”是清楚的。这个小小的短语为海德格尔的学术提出了一个重大问题：事后看来清晰的模棱两可的本质。玩弄祛魅的概念，我追溯马尔库塞对海德格尔的祛魅，从奥拉夫森的采访到他们 1947-8 年的信件往来，再到马尔库塞鲜为人知的“德国哲学，1871-1933”，最后到存在与时间本身，以论证海德格尔的死亡和内疚理论为事后问题提供了答案：一种我们可以从头到尾重新创造海德格尔纳粹主义如何影响他的思想的令人失望的故事的方式，