I present a merger model where a merged entity is assumed to acquire the market leadership from a linear, symmetric, simultaneous, homogeneous good, quantity-setting oligopoly and where efficiency gains are ruled out. If firms cannot merge to monopoly, mergers occur in waves, and for each number of pre-merger firms, I endogenize: (i) the number of mergers in a wave; (ii) the number of firms involved in each merger; and (iii) the order in which the mergers take place. If monopolization is allowed, in the majority of cases, all firms prefer to merge into a single entity. This suggests the strategic nature of merger waves as a response to the prohibition of monopolization. Finally, in sharp contrast with the existing results on horizontal mergers under simultaneous quantity competition without efficiency gains, and in line with empirical findings, profitability is ensured even if mergers involve a small number of firms.

我提出了一个合并模型，其中假设合并实体从线性、对称、同步、同质、数量设定的寡头垄断中获得市场领导地位，并且排除了效率增益。如果企业不能合并到垄断，合并会成波发生，对于每个合并前企业的数量，我内生化：(i) 一波合并的数量；(ii) 每次合并涉及的公司数量；(iii) 合并发生的顺序。如果允许垄断，在大多数情况下，所有公司都倾向于合并为一个实体。这表明并购浪潮的战略性质是对禁止垄断的回应。最后，与没有效率增益的同时数量竞争下横向合并的现有结果形成鲜明对比，并与实证结果一致，