This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I extend the traditional definition of lying to illocutionary acts executed by means of explicit performatives, focusing on promising. This is achieved in two steps. First, I discuss how the utterance of a sentence containing an explicit performative such as “I promise that Φ ” can count as an assertion of its content Φ . Second, I develop a general account of insincerity meant to explain under which conditions a given illocutionary act can be insincere, and show how this applies to promises. I conclude that a promise to Φ is insincere (and consequently a lie) only if the speaker intends not to Φ , or believes that he will not Φ , or both. In the second part, I test the proposed definition of lying by promising against the intuitions of ordinary language speakers. The results show that, unlike alternative accounts, the proposed definition makes the correct predictions in the cases tested. Furthermore, these results challenge the following necessary conditions for telling a lie with content p: that you have to assert p directly; that you have to believe that p be false; that p must be false; that you must aim to deceive the addressee into believing that p.

中文翻译：

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有希望的说谎

本文分为两部分。在第一部分中，我将撒谎的传统定义扩展到通过明确的表演者执行的言外行为，重点是希望。这是通过两个步骤实现的。首先，我将讨论包含显式执行词（例如“我保证Φ”）的句子的发声如何算作对其内容Φ的断言。其次，我发展了对不诚实的一般性解释，旨在解释在何种情况下既定的言外行为可能是不真诚的，并说明这如何适用于诺言。我得出的结论是，仅当说话人不愿意Φ或相信他不会Φ或两者兼而有之时，对Φ的承诺是不真诚的（因此是说谎）。在第二部分中，我通过答应普通语言使用者的直觉来测试对撒谎的定义。结果表明，与替代帐户不同，建议的定义可以在测试的案例中做出正确的预测。此外，这些结果挑战了以下必要条件，以便用内容p说谎：您必须相信p为假；p必须为假；您必须旨在欺骗收件人相信p。