A dual‐class share structure creates a separation between cash flow rights and voting rights. Dual‐class firms impact audit fees through their effect on supply/demand for auditing. This article examines the association between audit fees and dual‐class share structure for U.S. public firms. We find that a dual‐class share structure is associated with lower audit fees compared to single‐class firms. Further, within dual‐class firms, we find that the divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights is negatively associated with audit fees. The results are consistent with the managerial incentive‐alignment effect and/or the insulation effect of a dual‐class share structure on the supply/demand for audit services. This study highlights that the ownership structure of a firm constitutes an important role in audit pricing.

中文翻译：

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双重所有权结构和审计费用

双重股份结构在现金流权和投票权之间建立了分离。双重类别的公司通过影响审计的供求关系来影响审计费用。本文探讨了美国上市公司的审计费用与双重股权结构之间的关联。我们发现，与单类别公司相比，双类别股份结构与较低的审计费用相关。此外，在二类公司中，我们发现现金流量权和投票权之间的差异与审计费用负相关。结果与管理激励调整效应和/或双重股权结构对审计服务的供求的绝缘效应一致。这项研究强调，公司的所有权结构在审计定价中起着重要作用。