Abstract This paper examines the evolution of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) from its intellectual origins in the writings of Tugwell and Moulton, to the passage of the Act itself on June 17, 1933. What began as an attempt to address a structural problem, namely the widening gap between productivity and wages in manufacturing and mining, was transformed by President Franklin Roosevelt and Hugh Johnson into an economy-wide, multi-purpose policy instrument in the form of the NIRA and the subsequent President’s Reemployment Agreement (PRA). The multiple objectives and comprehensive breadth of the NIRA ultimately contributed to its demise. A simultaneous review of structural, cyclical and moral objectives, shows that the NIRA failed on all accounts. Specifically, firm and industry heterogeneity conspired to defeat all three objectives. Wages were increased in industries that had not been touched by electrification, contributing to lower aggregate employment and higher prices, thus providing an example of what not to do in the current debate over raising the minimum wage to $15.

中文翻译：

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罗斯福如何改变国家工业复兴法案

摘要 本文考察了国家工业复兴法案 (NIRA) 从其在 Tugwell 和 Moulton 著作中的思想起源到该法案本身于 1933 年 6 月 17 日通过的演变。 ，即制造业和采矿业生产率与工资之间不断扩大的差距，由富兰克林·罗斯福总统和休·约翰逊总统以 NIRA 和随后的总统再就业协议 (PRA) 的形式转变为一种全经济范围的多用途政策工具。NIRA 的多重目标和全面的广度最终导致了它的消亡。对结构性、周期性和道德目标的同步审查表明，NIRA 在所有方面都失败了。具体而言，企业和行业的异质性共同挫败了所有三个目标。