In this paper, the author develops a game theoretical model to understand why Union Government of India, as a third party, has used different schemes at different times in history to assist the State Governments in fighting the Naxalite insurgency. Comparing across schemes, it was found that though Matching Security Grants scheme was preferred in general, during asymmetric information scenario it led to an emergency situation wherein the Union Government had to provide the less preferred Bulk Security Grants. Later, it became difficult to withdraw these grants as the State Governments free rode by reducing own security contribution. The author finds that instead, in this scenario, Matching Development Grants are more suitable, as they incentivize the State Governments to reveal private information and help the Union Government exit its third-party role. For a practitioner involved in conflict resolution, these conclusions imply that as the desirability of policies can change diametrically overtime, Union Government must spend resources only on those heads of expenditure that provide both security and development benefits provided they aid in preventing flow of resources to Naxalites. Further, to end its assistance, the Union Government’s expenditures should also complement the capabilities of the State Government rather than substituting them. These results can also guide policy in other protracted civil wars with substantial third-party intervention, which are common these days.,The paper is an historical analysis of strategies used by Union and State Governments and Naxalites. The analysis is based on game theoretic tools supported with examples.,The Union Government must provide matching grants instead of bulk grants such as Central Armed Police Forces, and the grants should be aimed at building complementarities with the state governments’ security contributions. Under asymmetric information scenario, the Union and State Governments reduce their expenses incurred to fight the Naxalites. A Matching Development Grants scheme would have done better. Union Government must spend resources on heads of expenditure that provides both Development and Security benefits, to curb flow of resources to Naxalites, besides complementing the Security Contributions of the State Government.,The research is limited by disaggregated data to test the hypotheses. It is also limited by the data on hidden variables like the contribution of the Naxalites to fighting. The research is also limited to the extent that individual groups in the war like police commanders, politicians and Naxalite commanders are not incorporated. Multiple asymmetric parties are also not considered; that may generalize the model to other theaters of insurgency.,Certain heads of expenditure such as roads, mobile communication, improving quality of investigation, preventing human rights violations by the security forces, etc. are both security and development enhancing. The Union Government's expenditures must be directed toward this end. Therefore, from a practitioner's perspective, the debate between greed and grievances exists not as a limitation but as a guide. The relevant articles of Constitution of India must be redrafted on these principles. Third-party interventions in other insurgencies may be revisited under these conclusions.,Security and Development policies are tools for controlling Naxalite insurgency, which can also be used to prevent flow of resources to Naxalites. Security and development policies to resolving insurgencies are useful at different information scenarios. Therefore, information neutral policies should be preferred.,This paper has contributed theoretically in modeling continuing conflicts like Naxalite insurgency, explicitly. The author also shows that though the field of civil wars may have evolved along the Greed vs Grievance debate (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), for a practitioner, the lines blur when it comes to solutions, as many heads of expenditures have features of both security and development. This paper also shows that when the Union Government faced asymmetric information scenario, the policy of matching development grants would be beneficial in long run though of limited value in short run. This is an important conclusion as the most intense period of violence was preceded by the asymmetric information scenario. Besides, it has relevance for the other civil wars with third-party intervention, such as NATO in Afghanistan.

中文翻译：

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解决叛乱的政策——印度第三方干预的经验教训

在本文中，作者开发了一个博弈理论模型来理解为什么印度联邦政府作为第三方，在历史的不同时期使用不同的方案来协助邦政府打击纳萨尔派叛乱。比较不同方案，发现虽然匹配安全补助计划在一般情况下是首选的，但在信息不对称的情况下，它导致了紧急情况，联盟政府不得不提供不太受欢迎的批量安全补助。后来，由于州政府通过减少自己的安全贡献来自由骑行，因此很难收回这些赠款。作者发现，在这种情况下，匹配发展补助金更合适，因为他们激励州政府披露私人信息并帮助联邦政府退出其第三方角色。对于参与解决冲突的从业者来说，这些结论意味着，由于政策的可取性会随着时间的推移发生完全变化，联邦政府必须仅将资源用于那些提供安全和发展利益的支出项目，前提是它们有助于防止资源流向纳萨尔派. 此外，为了结束其援助，联邦政府的支出还应补充州政府的能力，而不是取而代之。这些结果还可以指导其他长期内战的政策，这些内战在第三方大量干预下很常见，这在当今很常见。该论文是对联盟和州政府以及纳萨尔派使用的策略的历史分析。分析基于博弈论工具，并有实例支持。联邦政府必须提供配套拨款，而不是中央武装警察部队等大宗拨款，拨款应旨在与州政府的安全贡献建立互补。在信息不对称的情况下，联盟和州政府减少了对抗纳萨尔派的费用。配套发展补助计划会做得更好。除了补充州政府的安全捐款外，联邦政府还必须将资源用于提供发展和安全福利的支出项目，以遏制资源流向纳萨尔派。该研究受到用于检验假设的分解数据的限制。它还受到隐藏变量数据的限制，例如纳萨尔派对战斗的贡献。该研究还仅限于没有纳入战争中的个别团体，如警察指挥官、政治家和纳萨尔派指挥官。也不考虑多个非对称方；这可能会将模型推广到其他叛乱战区。道路、移动通信、提高调查质量、防止安全部队侵犯人权等某些支出负责人既能促进安全，又能促进发展。联邦政府的支出必须用于此目的。因此，从从业者的角度来看，贪婪与不满之间的争论不是作为限制而是作为指导存在的。必须根据这些原则重新起草印度宪法的相关条款。根据这些结论，可能会重新审视第三方对其他叛乱的干预。安全与发展政策是控制纳萨尔派叛乱的工具，也可用于防止资源流向纳萨尔派。解决叛乱的安全和发展政策在不同的信息场景中很有用。因此，应该优先选择信息中立的政策。,本文在理论上对像纳萨尔派叛乱这样的持续冲突建模做出了明确的贡献。作者还表明，尽管内战领域可能随着贪婪与申诉的辩论（Collier 和 Hoeffler，2004 年）而演变，但对于从业者来说，当谈到解决方案时，界限变得模糊，因为许多支出负责人同时具有安全性和发展性。本文还表明，当联邦政府面临信息不对称的情况时，配套的发展补助政策从长远来看是有益的，但在短期内价值有限。这是一个重要的结论，因为最激烈的暴力时期发生在信息不对称情景之前。此外，它与第三方干预的其他内战有关，例如北约在阿富汗。配套发展补助政策从长远来看是有益的，但在短期内价值有限。这是一个重要的结论，因为最激烈的暴力时期发生在信息不对称情景之前。此外，它与第三方干预的其他内战有关，例如北约在阿富汗。配套发展补助政策从长远来看是有益的，但在短期内价值有限。这是一个重要的结论，因为最激烈的暴力时期发生在信息不对称情景之前。此外，它与第三方干预的其他内战有关，例如北约在阿富汗。