Abstract What distinguishes foreign exchange interventions that are stabilizing from those that are manipulative? In the current no-official-agreed-upon rules environment any country that intervenes and builds up bilateral trade surpluses opens itself to charges of currency manipulation. Emerging market countries are especially susceptible because many of them rely on exchange rate stabilization policies to offset external shocks and facilitate trade. This paper proposes an approach to setting international exchange rate policy rules that discourage currency manipulation as well as spurious allegations of manipulation. It examines how intervention operations work, and demonstrates how counterfactual matching techniques can be used to test for causal links between intervention policies and exchange rate movements.

中文翻译：

---

回顾汇率规则

摘要稳定的外汇干预与操纵性外汇干预有何区别？在当前没有经过官方同意的规则环境中，任何干预并建立双边贸易顺差的国家都可以接受操纵货币的指控。新兴市场国家尤其容易受到影响，因为其中许多国家依赖汇率稳定政策来抵消外部冲击并促进贸易。本文提出了一种设置国际汇率政策规则的方法，该规则不鼓励货币操纵以及虚假的操纵指控。它检查了干预操作的工作方式，并演示了反事实匹配技术如何用于测试干预政策和汇率变动之间的因果关系。