This paper studies the losses to the citizenry when the private agents discount the future at different rates from their government. In the presence of such a disagreement, the private sector may prefer an environment in which the government is in financial autarky. Using a sequence of sovereign debt models, the paper quantifies the potential welfare losses that citizens suffer from the government’s access to international bond markets. While the environment is not necessarily comprehensive, the analysis provides a counterweight to proposals that are designed to ease market access for sovereign borrowers.

中文翻译：

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外部主权借贷造成的福利损失

本文研究了当私人代理人以与政府不同的价格折现未来时给公民带来的损失。在存在这种分歧的情况下，私营部门可能更喜欢政府处于金融自给自足的环境。本文使用一系列主权债务模型，量化了公民因政府进入国际债券市场而遭受的潜在福利损失。尽管环境不一定全面，但分析为旨在缓解主权借款人市场准入的提议提供了平衡。