This article analyses the enforcement deficit plaguing the posting of workers. The rule subjecting posted workers to the social security system of their State of origin is enforced almost exclusively, but rather poorly, by that State. Because of its limited incentive and capacity to enforce the requirements for being posted, it often issues posting certificates without adequate verification. These rubber-stamped certificates bind the social security institutions and courts of the State of destination, thus hindering its enforcement machinery. The resulting gap in administrative enforcement enables employers to unilaterally choose the applicable social security legislation, quite possibly depriving their workers of the more generous social security protection of the State of destination while gaining an unfair competitive advantage over undertakings based there. Helpful though they may be, pending reforms of Regulation 883/2004 and Regulation 987/2009 are held back by an incomplete problem definition. Building on rationalist and managerial theories, I argue that the effectiveness of administrative enforcement depends on whether each posting requirement can be monitored by a State that is both willing and capable of doing so. The existing and envisaged allocation of administrative enforcement powers suffers from a misalignment between incentives, capacities and competences to monitor, which can be addressed by heightening incentives, by enhancing capacities, and by transferring competences to the State of destination.

中文翻译：

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工人的发布：执法、合规和改革

本文分析了困扰工人上岗的执法缺陷。使被派驻工人接受其原籍国社会保障制度的规则几乎完全由该国执行，但执行情况很差。由于其执行发布要求的动机和能力有限，它经常在未经充分验证的情况下颁发发布证书。这些橡皮戳证书约束目的地国的社会保障机构和法院，从而阻碍其执行机制。由此产生的行政执法差距使雇主能够单方面选择适用的社会保障立法，很可能剥夺其工人获得目的地国更慷慨的社会保障保护，同时获得相对于目的地国企业的不公平竞争优势。尽管它们可能有所帮助，但未完成的问题定义阻碍了法规 883/2004 和法规 987/2009 的未决改革。建立在理性主义和管理理论的基础上，我认为行政执法的有效性取决于每个发布要求是否可以由一个既愿意也有能力这样做的国家进行监督。现有和设想的行政执法权力分配受到激励、能力和监督能力之间的错位的影响，这可以通过加强激励、增强能力和将权限转移到目的地国来解决。