This paper uses the current proceedings against Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft for violations of its continuous disclosure obligation as a backdrop for addressing fundamental questions of European market abuse law. Specifically, we ask how the Market Abuse Directive and Regulation (MAD/R) and Member State corporate law together shape management’s disclosure policy vis-à-vis the stock market. Taking the perspective of German stock corporation law, our main findings are twofold: First, while European market abuse law severely limits management’s discretion when market integrity is at stake, Member States can still largely control its influence on internal corporate governance – i.e., on the distribution of information between management and shareholders. Second, MAD andMAR directly draw on conceptions of public interest in Member State law when determining the outer bounds of issuers’ ability to delay disclosure, thereby potentially promoting compliance. Based on these insights, the paper then closes with a note of caution for national legislators and suggests a more profound discussion of their responsibility for the optimal functioning of European market abuse law.

中文翻译：

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根据欧洲市场滥用法处理公司丑闻：大众案例

本文将针对大众汽车股份公司违反其持续披露义务的当前诉讼作为解决欧洲市场滥用法律基本问题的背景。具体而言，我们询问市场滥用指令和法规（MAD / R）和会员国公司法如何共同形成管理层针对股票市场的披露政策。从德国股份公司法的角度来看，我们的主要发现有两个方面：第一，当市场完整性受到威胁时，尽管欧洲市场滥用法严重限制了管理层的自由裁量权，但成员国仍可以在很大程度上控制其对内部公司治理的影响，即对内部公司治理的影响。在管理层和股东之间分配信息。第二，MAD和MAR在确定发行人延迟披露能力的外部界限时直接借鉴了成员国法律中的公共利益概念，从而有可能促进合规性。在这些见解的基础上，本文在结尾处特别提醒各国立法者，并就其对欧洲市场滥用法律的最佳运作的责任提出了更深入的讨论。