Resolving regimes of non-performing loans (NPLs) have raised concerns among supervisory authorities and banking regulators. NPLs play a central role in the linkages between poor lending and credit risks. This has implications for the management of asset quality and for the stability of the firm and the financial sector. A high stock of NPLs is undesirable to investors which can lead a decrease in the stock price, profitability loss and potentially to a distressed scenario. In the aftermath of the global crisis, the early resolution of NPLs requires coordinated insolvency proceedings and harmonised restructuring tools. The EU legislation introduced minimum loss coverage layers of capital for NPLs to address newly formed losses. Specifically, the supervisory toolkit implemented in the European Banking Union aims to improve the classification of loan quality and establish common practices to monitor non-performing exposures. This article argues that there is a need to enhance private arrangements within the resolution of distressed debts – alternative to public support such as asset management companies and securitisation mechanisms – which in turn would make it more manageable to reduce the NPL on banks’ balance sheet.

中文翻译：

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重组不良贷款以恢复银行：私人健身和证券化机制

不良贷款的解决机制引起了监管机构和银行监管机构的关注。不良贷款在不良贷款和信贷风险之间的联系中发挥着核心作用。这对资产质量的管理以及公司和金融部门的稳定性都有影响。不良贷款的大量存量对投资者而言是不可取的，这可能导致股价下跌，盈利能力下降，并可能导致陷入困境的局面。在全球危机之后，不良贷款的早期解决需要协调的破产程序和统一的重组工具。欧盟立法为不良贷款引入了最低损失保障资本层，以应对新形成的损失。具体来说，欧洲银行联盟（European Banking Union）实施的监督工具包旨在改善贷款质量的分类，并建立通用做法以监控不良敞口。本文认为，有必要在解决不良债务的过程中加强私人安排，这是资产管理公司和证券化机制等公共支持的替代方案，这反过来将使减少银行资产负债表上的不良贷款更易于管理。